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Wagner: Florida Constitutional Law: What Is the Legislature's Duty to Pro

CASE COMMENT
FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: WHAT IS THE
LEGISLATURE'S DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR
THE STATE'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
Coalitionfor Adequacy & Fairness
in School Funding,Inc. v. Chiles,
680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996)
E. John Wagner'
Appellants' filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Florida Constitution's education article2 creates a fundamental right to
an adequate education which the state violated by inadequately
providing for its educational system 3 Appellees4 argued that the
Appellants' complaint was beyond the court's jurisdiction because no
judicially manageable standards exist to evaluate educational adequacy.5
The trial court agreed with the Appellees, finding that the adequacy of
Florida's educational system is a non-justiciable political question.6
* Dedicated to my favorite teacher and a wonderful wife, Rosetta F Barrett-Wagner. I
thank Maria Hinds and Joe Dewey for their comments and suggestions.
1. Appellants included 11 public school students, their parents or guardians, 23 citizen
taxpayers who were members of individual school boards in Florida, and 45 county school
boards. Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 402
n.1 (Fla. 1996).
2. FLA. CONST. art. IX.

3. Coalition for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 402. Appellants alleged that the state made
inadequate provisions for certain students to obtain English proficiency; for the greater
educational needs of economically deprived students; for programs targeted at gifted, disabled
and mentally handicapped children; for the education of students in property-poor school
districts; for capital outlays; and for the school districts to perform their constitutional duties.
Id.
4. The Appellees included the Governor, the Commissioner of Education for the State
of Florida, the State Board of Education, the President of the Florida Senate, and the Speaker
of the Florida House of Representatives. Id. at 400.
5. Id. at 408.
6. Id. at 402 n.2. The trial court reached three other conclusions addressed by the instant
court. Specifically, the trial court held that the courts lacked a jurisdictional basis to issue a
declaratory judgment under the Appellants' claim, that the coalition and the school boards did
not have standing to sue for a violation of the Florida Constitution, and that the Appellants could
not state a claim against the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. Id. at 402
n.2. The instant court reversed the trial court on each of these issues. Id. at 402-03. The instant
court found that (1) declaratory relief was appropriate because uncertainty existed as to the
parties' constitutional rights and duties, iU! at 404; (2) the impact of the instant case on the
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Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the Appellants' complaint.' The
First District Court of Appeal did not review the trial court's opinion but
granted a request from all parties to immediately certify the case to the
Supreme Court of Florida.' The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the
trial court and HELD, that the Appellants' complaint did not allege a
violation of the Florida Constitution.'
The United States Constitution does not create a right to education.1° Moreover, difficulties in defining suspect classifications have
hampered equal protection claims for educational deprivations under
both the federal and Florida 2 constitutions. Consequently, education
litigation in Florida increasingly has been focused on the language of the
state constitution's education article. 3
appellant school boards and students precluded dismissal for lack of standing, id. at 403 n.4; and
(3) the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate could be joined as parties with an
interest in the subject matter of the case, id. at 403.
7. Id. at 402.
8. Id. The instant court granted certification of the instant case from the First District
Court of Appeal as a "case of great public importance requiring immediate resolution" by the
Supreme Court of Florida. Id. Article V, section 3(b)(5) of the Florida Constitution grants
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Florida over such cases.
9. Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 408.
10. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) ("Education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor
do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.").
11. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 22-23 (holding that the failure to show that "poor" persons
are concentrated in property-poor school districts precluded identification of a disadvantaged
class under the Equal Protection Clause); Gindl v. Department of Educ., 396 So. 2d 1105, 110506 (Fla. 1979) (holding that a statute permitting different property tax millage assessments
between school districts did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution because it provided for "substantial equality of education" between school districts).
But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that a statute facially prohibiting
undocumented aliens from attending public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause to the
United States Constitution).
12. See Gindl, 396 So. 2d at 1105-06 (holding that a statute permitting different property
tax millage assessments between school districts did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Florida Constitution because it provided for "substantial equality of education" between
school districts). Florida's treatment of equal protection claims for educational deprivations is
consistent with the trend nationwide. See Peter Enrich, Leaving EqualityBehind: New Directions
in School Finance Refonn, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 143-44 (1995) ("mhe majority of state
courts to confront the issue has [sic] followed the Supreme Court in finding that constitutional
commands of equality do not forbid the disparities--often quite extreme disparities-in school
funding that result from reliance on local property taxation."); see also William E. Thro, The
Significance of the Tennessee School FinanceDecision, 85 EDUC. L. REP. (WEST) 11, 18 (1993)
(observing the overall lack of success of education finance litigation based on various state equal
protection claims nationwide).
13. See, e.g., Florida Dep't of Educ. v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944, 947 (Fla. 1993); St. Johns
County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 641 (Fla. 1991); School Bd. of
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The Florida Constitution's education article provides in part that
"[a]dequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform system of free
public schools."' 4 Prior to the instant case, the Florida courts had not
considered whether the "adequate provision" language in the education
article creates a fundamental right to education. 5 However, in two
decisions addressing the limits of a "uniform system," the supreme court
had alluded to the possibility that the Florida Constitution places a duty
on the Legislature to provide for education.16
In St. Johns County v. Northeast FloridaBuilders Ass'n, 7 a county
enacted an ordinance assessing an impact fee on new building permits
to finance capital improvements in its public schools. 8 The plaintiffs
argued that the ordinance was inconsistent with the education article's
uniform system requirement because it caused the county's school
financing scheme to deviate from the plans used in other counties.' 9
Upholding the impact fee, the NortheastFloridaBuilders court observed
that differences in property values, millage assessments, and other
factors cause inherent inequalities between expenditures in different
school districts.' In light of these circumstances, the NortheastFlorida
Builders court interpreted the Florida Constitution as only requiring that
"every student [have] an equal chance to achieve basic educational goals
prescribed by the legislature [sic]."'"
The Supreme Court of Florida revisited the education article's
uniform system requirement in Florida Department of Education v.

Escambia County v. State, 353 So. 2d 834, 836-37 (Fla. 1977). Prior to the instant case, the case
law dealing with the Florida Constitution's education article focused on the requisite level of
uniformity within the education system. Barbara J. Staros, School FinanceLitigationin Florida:
A HistoricalAnalysis, 23 STETSON L. REv. 497, 518 (1994). However, the Florida courts have
yet to hold in favor of a plaintiff alleging unconstitutional inequalities among Florida's school

districts. Id. at 519.
14. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
15. Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 405-06; Staros, supranote 13, at 518-19.
16. See Glasser, 622 So. 2d at 947 (stating that the court "may be required in some future
case to determine whether the Legislature has provided 'a uniform system.' "); NortheastFlorida

Builders, 583 So. 2d at 641 (stating that "[t]he Florida Constitution only requires that a system
be provided that gives every student an equal chance to achieve basic educational goals

prescribed by the legislature [sic]").
17. 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991).
18. Id. at 637. The ordinance required use of the fees to" 'acquire, construct, expand and
equip the educational sites and educational capital facilities necessitated by new development.'"
Id. (quoting St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60, § 10(B) (Oct. 20, 1987)).
19. Id.

20. Id.at 641.
21. Id.The court did not discuss which goals the Legislature had set for Florida's

educational system. See id.
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Glasser.' Glasser involved a county school board's effort to increase
real property taxes without enabling legislation.23 The school board
argued that the NortheastFloridaBuilders interpretation of the phrase
uniform system empowered an individual school district to provide for
any level of education so long as the provision satisfied the Legislature's
educational goals2 The Glasser court rejected this argument, holding
that the Legislature should define the meaning of uniform system in the
education article.' Thus, even though the supreme court had applied
the uniform system requirement in Northeast Florida Builders,26 the
education article did not enter into the Glasser court's analysis of the
school board's complaint.27
The Glasser court concluded in dicta by alluding to a basic right to
education "in a democracy" and by noting that the Legislature provides
for that right through its annual appropriations.28 Notably, the Glasser
22. 622 So. 2d 944, 947 (Fla. 1993).
23. Id. at 946. The relevant property tax was the tax on "nonvoted discretionary millage"
within its school district. Id.
24. Id. at 947.
25. Id. In concurrence, Justice Kogan indicated that the "uniform system" requirement still
could place some limits on the Legislature's discretion after Glasser
Florida law now is clear that the uniformity clause will not be construed as tightly
restrictive, but merely as establishing a larger framework in which a broad degree
of variation is possible....
For example, the mere fact that one district cannot afford to provide Latin or
painting classes, but another can, does not create a lack of uniformity. However,
the inability of one district to pay for any instruction whatsoever in mathematics
or language and writing skills would constitute a lack of uniformity if any other
district is not similarly disadvantaged. The Legislature cannot allow students in one
district to be deprived of basic educational opportunities while students in other
districts do not suffer the same.
There is a vast grey area lying between the two extremes of my hypothetical
here; and in this grey area it is necessarily the legislature's prerogative to operate
according to its own policies.
specially concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. at 950-51 (Kogan, J.,
26. Northeast FloridaBuilders, 583 So. 2d at 641.
27. Glasser,622 So. 2d at 947. Ultimately, the supreme court dismissed Glasserbased on
other provisions in the Florida Constitution. See id. at 946-47. Specifically, article VII, § 9(a)
of the Florida Constitution provides that "[c]ounties, school districts, and municipalities shall,
and special districts may, be authorized by law to levy ad valorem taxes." The Glasser court
found that an interpretation of article VII, § 9(a) which permitted a school board to increase
property taxes without enabling legislation would improperly ignore the phrase" 'shall... be
authorized by law.' " Glasser, 622 So. 2d at 947.
28. Glasser,622 So. 2d at 948. Two concurring justices expressly disclaimed Glasser as
authority for the existence of a fundamental right to education. Id. at 950 n.8 (Kogan, J.,
specially concurring); id. at 949 (Barkett, C.J., concurring). Justice Kogan found that the Florida
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court did not inquire into the purposes behind an educational system in
a democracy which would determine the content of a right to education.29 Indeed, prior to the instant case, the Florida courts had not
directly considered the reasons Florida's citizens provided for an
educational system in their current state constitution.3" As one jurist on
the instant court indicated by reference, the United States Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education1 could help
fill that gap. 2
In Brown, a case decided fourteen years before Florida ratified its
current constitution, the Supreme Court discussed the functions of state
educational systems in modem society?' These functions fit within two
classifications. First, the Court noted that education is instrumental to
preserving a democratic society because it trains students to perform
public service and practice good citizenship.' Second, the Court
observed that education is an integral factor in each individual's success
in life.3" This is because education is the primary tool through which
persons learn cultural values, acquire skills for professional life, and
adjust to their environment.36
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Florida had to decide
which, if any, of these values should inform the level of duty that the
adequate provision clause in the education article places on the
Legislature.37 While only one jurist of the instant court expressly
recognized a "fundamental right" to an adequate education, 3' a majority
Constitution does not create a fundamental right to education. Id. at 950 n.8 (Kogan, J., specially
concurring). Chief Justice Barkett noted that Glasserdid not involve a question of whether the
Legislature had made an "adequate provision" for education. Id. at 949 (Barkett, C.J.,

concurring).
29. See id. at 948.
30. Although no court had considered the educational system's purposes under the current
constitution, the Supreme Court of Florida had observed that "the purpose intended to be
accomplished in establishing" a school system under the Florida Constitution of 1885 was "to
advance and maintain proper standards of enlightened citizenship." State v. Henderson, 188 So.

351, 353 (Fla. 1939).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court held that racial segregation in state public
school systems violates the Equal Protection Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 495.
32. CoalitionforAdequacy, 680 So. 2d at409 (Overton, J., concurring) (citing Brown, 347

U.S. at 493).
33. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 405-06 (noting that "the level of duty the
present education clause places upon the legislature [sic] to ensure a certain quality of education
in Florida" had yet to be determined).
38. Id. at 410 (Overton, J., concurring).
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of the justices found that the education article creates a judicially
enforceable duty requiring the Legislature to provide some minimum
quality of education in the state.39 Nevertheless, the instant court
dismissed the Appellants' complaint for failure to allege' a violation
of that duty.41 Although none of the instant court's three opinions 42
enumerated a comprehensive set of identifiable standards for the
Legislature to meet,43 each opinion produced a distinct view of the
values that should inform the Legislature's duty to provide for education.
In the first opinion, a three-justice plurality held that the adequacy
educational system is a non-justiciable political question."
Florida's
of

39. In addition to Justice Overton's recognition of a fundamental right to education, three
dissenting justices placed a duty on the Legislature to provide for education. See id. at 410
(Anstead, J., joined by Kogan, C.J. and Shaw, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court of Florida has
seven members. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 3(a).
40. For a list of the Appellants' allegations, see supra note 3.
41. Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 407.
42. None of the instant case's opinions drew a majority of the court. See id. at 406.
43. See id. at 402-11. The fact that a majority of the instant court found a duty in the
Legislature to provide for education does not necessarily mean that the supreme court will ever
attempt to enumerate precise standards of educational adequacy:
In many states, the conditions in the worst off schools are so poor and the
resources available to them so meager that the courts can reasonably be asked to
find a dereliction of the state's educational obligations without the need to
articulate or apply a determinable standard of adequacy. Such a finding only
commits the court to a minimal floor beneath the constitutional standard of
adequacy, not an articulation of the standard itself.
While such a strategy may not suffice to ensure levels of state financial
commitment commensurate to the needs of poorer districts or the hopes of litigants,
it may often suffice to support a finding that an existing state system for financing
education is impermissible. The simple fact is that the schools in poor districts in
many states are so underfunded and so educationally deficient that they would fail
even the most minimal measure of adequacy. A strong argument can be made that
a court should not decline to recognize such evident failings even if unable or
unwilling to articulate a precise constitutional standard to be applied to potential
future cases.
Enrich, supra note 12, at 173 (footnotes omitted).
44. Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 408 (Grimes, J., joined by Harding and Wells,
JJ., concurring). The plurality found that the adequacy of Florida's educational system falls
within two of the six criteria in the United States Supreme Court's formulation of a nonjusticiable political question. Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962)). First, the
plurality found that the Florida Constitution contains "a textually demonstrable commitment" of
the educational adequacy issue to the Legislature. Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 209). Article
VII, § l(c) of the Florida Constitution provides: "No money shall be drawn from the treasury
except in pursuance of appropriation made by law." The plurality interpreted this provision as
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Accordingly, the plurality dismissed the Appellants' complaint without
identifying any values that could give content to the Legislature's duty
to provide for education."
In a separate opinion and writing solely for himself, Justice Overton
observed that the education article does not authorize judicial micromanagement of the Legislature's policy decisions.' Nevertheless,
Justice Overton found that the Florida Constitution creates a fundamental right to an adequate education.47 In so doing, Justice Overton noted
this nation's founding fathers' belief that an educated populace is
necessary to preserve freedom." In addition, Justice Overton observed
the Brown court's discussion of the relationship between education and
democracy.49 Justice Overton found that, to uphold these values, the

an exclusive delegation of appropriations power to the Legislature. Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680
So. 2d at 408 (Grimes, J., joined by Harding and Wells, JJ., concurring) (citing Chiles v.
Children A, B, C, D, E and F, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991)). Believing that a holding in
favor of the Appellants would require ordering the Legislature to appropriate funds, the plurality
reasoned that such a holding would impinge on the proper separation of powers. Id.
Second, the plurality found" 'a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards'"
for determining the content of an adequate provision for education. Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S.
at 209). Although the plurality did not explain why such standards do not exist, see id., one
commentator has observed:
This indeterminacy of the measure of an adequate education poses a particularly
daunting challenge to efforts to deploy adequacy arguments in the courts.
Legislatures, after all, are accustomed to deciding how far to go in pursuing a
particular policy aim, on the basis of available resources, competing demands for
them, and often inarticulate judgments about societal priorities. Courts, however,
assert with monotonous regularity that such political or "legislative" judgments are
beyond their institutional competence and responsibility. Faced with a constitutional
provision mandating an indeterminate (but very large) dedication of governmental
resources, a court's most natural inclination is to defer to the choices made by the
political branches, or even to construe the provision as exclusively a matter for
legislative discretion.
Enrich, supra note 12, at 171-72 (footnotes omitted).
45. See Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 407-08 (Grimes, J., joined by Harding and
Wells, JJ., concurring).
46. Id. at 409 (Overton, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 409, 410.
48. Id. at 409. Justice Overton quoted Thomas Jefferson and James Madison as evidence
of the founding fathers' views on education. Id. Although Justice Overton did not define
"freedom," he did observe that "[tihere have been many examples in the world where, when
tyrannical individuals or entities seize power, their first action is to eliminate, imprison, or exile
the educated and take control of the educational process." Id.
49. Id. (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
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education article requires the Legislature to provide for a "literate,
knowledgeable population."5
Believing that illiteracy across a "significant segment" of the
population would threaten freedom, Justice Overton used a county with
a thirty-percent illiteracy rate as an example of a constitutionally
inadequate provision for education.51 Without discussing the
Appellants' individual allegations, Justice Overton held that the
Appellants' complaint did not assert such a violation. 2 As a result,
Justice Overton concurred with the plurality in dismissing the
Appellants' complaint. 3
Three justices dissented. ' The dissenting justices interpreted the
education article as a mandate requiring the Legislature to provide an
educational system consistent with education's "fundamental value" to
society.55 Approving Justice Overton's analysis of education's importance to preserving freedom, 6 they joined Justice Overton in using a
county with a thirty-percent illiteracy rate as an example of an inadequate provision for education.57
However, the dissenting justices parted with Justice Overton by
recognizing that education plays an instrumental role in fostering the
equal opportunity principles on which our society was founded."
Accordingly, they reasoned that Florida's citizens included the adequate
provision language in the education article for the benefit of the children
who receive the educational system's services.59 In this context, the
dissent found that the Appellants' complaint was sufficient to allege
a violation of the Legislature's duty to provide for education under the
Florida Constitution.6

50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Id. at 408, 409.
53. Id. at 408.
54. Id. (Anstead, J., joined by Kogan, C.J. and Shaw, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 410.
56. See id. ("Justice Overton has also made an eloquent case for the importance of
education in our society. Indeed, that case stands unrebutted.").
57. Id. Without naming any other specific violations, the dissent noted that conditions

other than low literacy rates could prove a constitutionally inadequate provision for education.
Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. For a list of the Appellants' allegations, see supra note 3.
61. Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 410 (Anstead, J., joined by Kogan, C.J. and
Shaw, J., dissenting). The dissent would have remanded the instant case for an evidentiary
hearing on the factual circumstances surrounding the Appellants' allegations. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss2/4

8

Wagner: Florida Constitutional Law: What Is the Legislature's Duty to Pro
CASE COMMFNT

While a majority of the instant court recognized some judicially
enforceable level of educational adequacy under the Florida Constitution,62 the supreme court's prior education article jurisprudence did not
compel that result.63 The Northeast Florida Builders court implicitly
excluded the judiciary from any role in defining minimum educational
standards when it assigned that responsibility to the Legislature.'
Although Glasser alluded to a right to education in dicta, the Glasser
court's complementary observation that the Legislature provides for that
right in its annual appropriations65 indicates that the court did not
intend to refer to a judicially enforceable right.' Moreover, the
Northeast Florida Builders court's allowance of broad variations
between school districts67 followed by the Glasser court's abdication
of the power to define the boundaries of a uniform system68 evidences
an aversion to injecting the judiciary into Florida's educational system.
Consequently, because a majority of the instant court held that the
Legislature has a duty to provide for education,69 the instant case
expanded the judiciary's role in policing Florida's educational system
beyond that found in the supreme court's previous education article
jurisprudence.
Once it is recognized that the instant court has extended the
judiciary's role in education, the central question becomes: what
standard of educational adequacy must the Legislature satisfy to avoid
judicial intervention? Because it found the adequacy of Florida's
educational system non-justiciable, the three-justice plurality would
refrain from intervening under almost any circumstances." However,
a majority of the court, Justice Overton 71 and the three dissenting

62. See supra note 39.
63. See Staros, supra note 13, at 513-14.
64. Northeast FloridaBuilders, 583 So. 2d at 641.
65. Glasser,622 So. 2d at 948.
66. Cf. Staros, supra note 13, at 514 (observing that the Supreme Court of Florida's
history of deference to the Legislature in education claims indicated that the Glasser court did
not intend to refer to a judicially enforceable right). The separate concurring opinions of then
Chief Justice Barkett, Glasser, 622 So. 2d at 949 (Barkett, C.J., concurring), and then Justice
Kogan, id. at 950 n.8 (Kogan, J., specially concurring), which expressly disclaimed the creation
of any judicially enforceable right to an education, further diminished Glasser's value as
authority for creating a constitutional right to education. See Staros, supra note 13, at 514-15;
see also supra note 28.
67. Northeast FloridaBuilders, 583 So. 2d at 641.
68. Glasser,622 So. 2d at 947.
69. See supra note 39.
70. Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 408 (Grimes, J., joined by Harding and Wells,

JJ., concurring).
71. Id. at 409-10 (Overton, J., concurring).
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justices, 2 found educational adequacy justiciable. Consequently, this
supreme court would intervene if the quality of the educational system
fell below the level demanded by both Justice Overton and the dissent.
Justice Overton's dismissal of the Appellants' complaint 3 demonstrates
that Justice Overton applied a less stringent standard of educational
adequacy than the dissent.74 Consequently, Justice Overton's opinion
defines the duty that this court would place on the Legislature.
Because Justice Overton did not comprehensively enumerate specific
standards of educational adequacy and did not analyze the Appellants'
individual allegations,75 the duty that Justice Overton placed on the
Legislature must be inferred from the values he associated with Florida's
educational system. From this perspective, Justice Overton substantially
limited the Legislature's duty by narrowly defining the value of
education.76 Because Justice Overton only considered education's utility
in preserving freedom, the Legislature's duty does not require a

72. Id. at 410-11 (Anstead, J., joined by Kogan, C.J. and Shaw, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 408 (Overton, J., concurring).
74. One could argue that Justice Overton's dismissal of the instant case does not
demonstrate the application of a less stringent standard of educational adequacy because it could
be explained by the application of a different standard of pleading. The dissent found the
Appellants' "comprehensive" allegations sufficient to warrant further proceedings because an
evidentiary hearing might reveal facts which show constitutional inadequacy. Id. at 410
(Anstead, J., joined by Kogan, C.J. and Shaw, J., dissenting). In contrast, because the Appellants
did not precisely allege an illiteracy rate of 30% in any county, see id. at 402, or some other
condition demonstrating an inadequate provision for education, Justice Overton could have
concluded that the Appellants' broad allegations did not include the ultimate facts necessary to
state a cause of action while applying a substantive standard identical to that of the dissent. See
FLA. R. Cv. P. 1.110 (requiring a claimant to plead a "statement of the ultimate facts showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief").
However, this argument is not compelling because factors other than Justice Overton's
dismissal of the instant case demonstrate that the dissent would require a less egregious showing
of educational inadequacy before intervening in Florida's educational system. Unlike Justice
Overton, the dissent expressly acknowledged that facts other than a 30% illiteracy rate could
justify judicial action. Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 410 (Anstead, J., joined by Kogan,
C.J. and Shaw, J., dissenting). Moreover, in addition to acknowledging education's role in
thwarting despotism, the dissent recognized education's value in providing equal opportunities
for Florida's citizens. Id. Thus, unlike Justice Overton, the dissenting justices would allow for
judicial scrutiny of the education system even where freedom is not threatened.
75. See Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 408-10 (Overton, J., concurring). For a list
of the Appellants' allegations, see supra note 3.
76. See Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 409, 410.
77. Id. Although Justice Overton's quotation of Brown referred to the importance of
education in a democracy, id. at 409 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493), Justice Overton's
suggestion that uneducated nations are susceptible to tyrannical influences indicates that Justice
Overton intended to implicate the same values when he referred to "democracy" and "freedom."
See id.; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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provision that creates educational opportunities for all of Florida's
citizens." For example, with respect to literacy, Justice Overton would
not find a constitutionally relevant threat to freedom until a significant
79
segment of the population, as much as thirty-percent, is illiterate.
Thus, although Justice Overton's use of the phrase "fundamental
right 8 suggests the creation of an individual right," in reality, Justice
Overton's standard of educational adequacy fails to consider the
educational system's role in benefiting its individual students.
Justice Overton's opinion provides two possible explanations for its
sole consideration of education's function in preserving freedom. First,
Justice Overton's observation that a constitutional right to an adequate
education need not require judicial micro-management of the Legislature82 indicates a preference for legislative discretion in the area of
education. By itself, this explanation begs the question. Under our legal
system, the Legislature does not have discretion to act outside the
bounds of the Florida Constitution. 3

78. Neither the United States Constitution nor the Equal Protection Clause in the Florida
Constitution readily fill this gap. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text. Moreover, the
Glasser court's abdication of the right to define "uniform system," Glasser,622 So. 2d at 947,
brings into question the Northeast Florida Builders court's observation that the Florida
Constitution guarantees "every student" an equal opportunity to achieve a minimum standard of
education, Northeast FloridaBuilders, 583 So. 2d at 641. But see Glasser,622 So. 2d at 950-51
(Kogan, J., specially concurring) (observing that "[tihe Legislature cannot allow students in one
district to be deprived of basic educational opportunities while other students in districts do not
suffer the same"). See also supra note 25.
79. Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 409 (Overton, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 409, 410.
81. A "right" in the "juristic" sense has been defined as "a capacity residing in one man
of controlling, with the assent and assistance of the state, the actions of others." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 1324 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). A "fundamental right" is a right protected
by the Federal Constitution or a state constitution. Id. at 674. If fundamental rights are rights,
and rights reside in individuals, then fundamental rights also reside in individuals.
82. Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 409 (Overton, J.concurring).
83. In Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla.
1972), the Supreme Court of Florida observed:
The judiciary is in a lofty sense the guardian of the law of the land and the
Constitution is the highest law. A constitution would be a meaningless instrument
without some responsible agency of government having authority to enforce it. ...
When the people have spoken through their organic law concerning their basic
rights, it is primarily the duty of the legislative body to provide the ways and
means of enforcing such rights; however, in the absence of appropriate legislative
action, it is the responsibility of the courts to do so.
The plurality in the instant case similarly begged the question when it found
that the "adequate provision" language of the education article does not create an
exception to the Legislature's power to exercise discretion over appropriations.
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A second possible explanation lies in the sources Justice Overton
utilized to inform his approach to educational adequacy, but these
sources ultimately do not support a view that limits the utility of modem
educational systems to preserving freedom. By relying on our nation's
founding fathers' beliefs concerning the functions of education in
society, 4 Justice Overton assumed that our nation associated the same
values with education in the eighteenth century as it did when Florida
ratified its current constitution in 1968. In fact, the other authority on
which Justice Overton relied, the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,5 demonstrates a dramatic
expansion in the role of education over that period.86 In Brown, a case
decided more than a decade before Florida ratified its current constitution, the Court's specific reference to education's importance to
individual success in modem times indicated that, if helping individuals
was not a goal of the nation's framers, 7 it had become the function of
modem educational systems.88
In contrast with Justice Overton, the dissent directly considered the
educational system's function in benefiting its students.8 9 While
acknowledging education's role in preserving freedom, the dissent also
recognized equality of opportunity as a foundational principle that
Florida's citizens sought to foster by providing for an educational

Coalition for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 407 (Grimes, J., joined by Harding and Wells, JJ.,
concurring); see also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. Because a constitutional duty
would create an exception to what is ordinarily the Legislature's discretionary power, Dade
County Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 269 So. 2d at 686, the plurality had to assume that the
"adequate provision" language in the education article does not give rise to a constitutional duty.
84. See Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 409 (Overton, J., concurring).
85. Id. (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
86. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
87. One commentator has suggested that, in the Jeffersonian view, providing equal
educational opportunities would threaten freedom:
The Jeffersonian... assigned the educator a largely conservative task, namely to
adjust men to their present roles in society. To fail to shape education to the
existing political and economic framework of society might imperil republicanism
itself. Whenever men wandered off into the wilderness of metaphysics, priests and
tyrants could easily mislead them. Any subject matter unrelated to the special
condition of the student-instead of.seeming a means for freeing him from the
confinement of his present status-seemed a weapon for his oppression by the
priestly custodians of "useless" knowledge.
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON

223 (Phoenix ed. 1981).

88. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
89. Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 410 (Anstead, J., joined by Kogan, C.J. and
Shaw, J., dissenting).
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system in their state constitution.' Although the dissent did not extend
its analysis beyond this point,91 common sense indicates that failing to
provide individuals with the opportunity to acquire basic educational
skills would violate equal opportunity principles. Thus, although the
dissent did not expressly find an individual right to education,92 it
offered a mode of analysis which could effectively provide a guarantee
of educational opportunity to individuals.93 Consequently, if adopted by
a majority of the instant court, the dissent's standard of educational
adequacy could have comprehensively informed the Florida Constitution
of modem expectations for Florida's educational system.94
By limiting the Legislature's duty to provide for education, Justice
Overton served his express purpose of leaving the Legislature with
substantial discretion over Florida's educational system.95 However, a
preference for legislative power alone does not justify judicial abdication
when the Legislature's decisions violate the Florida Constitution.96 In
the eighteenth century, our nation's founding fathers may have solely
acknowledged education's utility in preserving freedom.97 Nevertheless,
under the Florida Constitution of 1968, education should mean
something more. Equality of opportunity is a foundational value in our
society, and education is the key to its realization." Because Justice
Overton ignored this purpose,9 9 the instant case fails to provide
constitutional protection commensurate with education's fundamental
value to the State of Florida.

90. Id.
91. See id. at 410-11.
92. See id.
93. Nevertheless, the dissent did not unequivocally create an individual right to education
under the Florida Constitution. The dissent did not specifically state whether it would find a
single educational deprivation in violation of the Legislature's duty to provide for education. See
id. In addition, some doubt exists as to whether one member of the dissent, Justice Kogan,
would find an individual educational right under the Florida Constitution where he had
previously disclaimed the existence of a fundamental right to education in Glasser.Glasser,622
So. 2d at 950 n.8 (Kogan, J., specially concurring).
94. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (discussing the modem functions of state education

systems).
95. See Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 409 (Overton, J., concurring).
96. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n, 269 So. 2d at 686.
97. See Coalitionfor Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 409 (Overton, J., concurring); see also
supra note 87.
98. Id. at 410 (Anstead, J., joined by Kogan, C.J. and Shaw, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 408-10 (Overton, J., concurring) (limiting the education article's purpose
under the Florida Constitution to preserving freedom).
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